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POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY 
SENEM AYDIN AND RUŞEN ÇAKIR* 
The AKP’s evolution 
When the Islamist Welfare Party won power in Turkey’s 1995 elections, it conspicuously 
invoked political Islam and took a clear stand against the EU and NATO, advocating instead an 
Islamic common market and an Islamic NATO. It adopted anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli 
language, and tried to forge closer links with Iran, Libya and Syria. Such policies and discourse 
alienated the secular political elite, the military and the public to the extent that in 1997 the 
National Security Council moved to ease the Welfare Party out of government, in what has 
become known as Turkey’s ‘post-modern coup’.  
The Welfare Party’s parliamentary group joined a short-lived Virtue Party (FP), only to be 
closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for being the ‘centre of anti-secular activities’. 
The former Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, together with the reformists of the 
Welfare Party, formed the AKP and immediately disassociated themselves from the old 
leadership and ideology. The party came to power in the 2002 elections, obtaining 34% of the 
votes. The AKP elite labelled themselves ‘conservative democrats’, placed a strong emphasis on 
democracy and human rights, advocated EU membership, supported globalisation and eschewed 
‘anti-Western’ discourse.  
There were a number of reasons for this shift in discourse and policy. The opposition of 
important segments of civil society and the increasing resentment of the military during the 
Welfare Party’s coalition government were crucial. The post-modern coup initiated a “learning 
process” among political Islamists, with the latter realising that a party not respecting secularism 
“would have no chance of sustained and effective participation in the Turkish political system 
given its constitutional boundaries”.
1 They also realised that they needed the West and 
democracy to build a broader front against the centres of radical secularism in the judiciary, at 
high levels of the state bureaucracy, in the mainstream media and especially the military. Within 
this framework, the EU began to be regarded as a natural ally in efforts to decrease the power of 
the military and to achieve a system of democratic governance, within which Islamic social and 
political forces would be regarded as legitimate players.
2  
Disassociation from the anti-Western discourse went hand in hand with the complete 
abandonment of the anti-globalisation discourse. Turkey’s 2001 financial crisis had fully 
eliminated any possibility of upholding an anti-Western and anti-globalisation discourse when 
the country had to adhere to a strict International Monetary Fund programme and was in 
desperate need of foreign investment. Furthermore, the previous Welfare Party experience had 
also shown that a broad-based, cross-class alliance was essential for the party to attract the 
broader electoral base required for it to classify itself as a mass party. This alliance, which 
encompassed “the more dynamic and prosperous segments of society that were benefiting from 
                                                 
* Senem Aydın is a Research Fellow at the Free University of Brussels (VUB) and an Associate Research 
Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. Ruşen Çakır is the Washington, D.C. 
correspondent for the daily newspaper Vatan. 
1 See Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Turkey’s AKP”, in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of 
a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006, p. 212. 
2 See İhsan D. Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights Discourse 
in the Search for Security and Legitimacy”, in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: 
Democracy and the AK Parti, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006. 2 | AYDIN &ÇAKIR  
the globalisation process in material terms as well as the more disadvantaged and 
underprivileged segments of society”, meant that the party could neither afford to adopt an anti-
globalisation discourse nor become engaged in constant fights with the secular centre.
3  
The AKP is not a monolithic or homogenous party. It should rather be understood more as a 
coalition of different factions. This was best seen in the incident where, despite the efforts of 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, 99 AKP MPs in the Turkish parliament voted against the deployment 
of United States’ troops in south-eastern Turkey for the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, as many as five 
factions can be identified within the party. The core of the party and the overwhelming majority 
of its parliamentarians consist of individuals who were affiliated with the National Outlook 
Movement (NOM – the Islamist grouping that emerged in response to the 1960 military coup) 
in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Key figures such as 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, President of the National Assembly Bülent Arınç and the Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gül are among those who come from the NOM movement. The second 
largest faction within the party consists of those who joined the AKP from the ranks of 
conventional centre-right parties – mainly the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path 
Party. The other three factions that occupy a smaller space within the party involve Islamists 
from various sects who had joined the Welfare Party in the 1980s and 1990s, and moved into 
the AKP ranks after a gradual liberalisation of their views. These include Mr Erdoğan’s close 
associates from the Istanbul municipality, some of whom were technocrats not affiliated with 
the NOM, and some former bureaucrats, such as former Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, who had 
previously served under centre-right governments. 
The AKP elite rejects formal reference to Islam or to the notion of their being ‘Muslim 
democrats’, as often suggested in Europe.
4 Their preferred label of ‘conservative democracy’ 
remains vague, however. It is less of an ideology, and more of “an organic synthesis” that 
claims to “give voice to the Turkish people’s values and to bridge the gap between the state and 
the people”.
5 Hence the party in fact “assumes the presence of a set of shared social values, but 
also claims full knowledge of society’s needs and desires”, a view that according to some 
analysts is open to “authoritarian expansion as the party assumes it can exercise collective 
reasoning on behalf of the public without making its rationale clear to those whom it is 
governing”.
6 The attempt to criminalise adultery during the adoption of the new Penal Code in 
2005 on grounds of such shared ‘social values’ is an example. How such values are defined, 
justified and selected remains (for some, dangerously) ambivalent. 
Ambivalence also remains on how to approach modernity. The party’s ideological manifesto, as 
described in their publication Conservative Democracy, highlights that “it is necessary to accept 
modernity to its full extent…nevertheless its philosophical foundations…should be first 
differentiated from their misconceived practices and descriptions, [and only then] must be 
mixed with local values”.
7 This stance implies that modernity and tradition are not perceived to 
be in conflict. But the question of “whether and how modernity’s philosophical foundations can 
be adopted selectively” remains unanswered.
8 
                                                 
3 See Öniş (2006), op. cit. 
4 The concept of ‘conservative democracy’ is explicitly dealt with in the AKP’s ideological manifesto by 
Yalçın Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi [Conservative Democracy], AK Parti, Ankara, 2004. 
5 See Sultan Tepe, “A Pro-Islamic Party? Promises and Limits of Turkey’s Justice and Development 
Party”, in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006. 
6 See Tepe (2006), op. cit., pp. 121-22. 
7 See Akdoğan (2004), op. cit., p. 20, cited in Tepe (2006) supra, p. 122. 
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Such ambivalence is also present in the party’s line on the public role of Islam.
9 The AKP has 
implemented significant democratic reform, primarily in the fields of the fight against torture; 
the strengthening of civilian control over the military; the reinforcement of human rights; and 
the protection of minorities, freedom of expression, assembly and association. But the public 
role of Islam, a long-disputed cause of tension in Turkish politics, has not been addressed. One 
of the most prominent issues in relation to the public role of Islam concerns the headscarf ban. 
A Council of State decision in 1984 and, more recently, a 1997 Constitutional Court decision, 
prohibit the use of headscarves in all public institutions, including schools and universities. Mr 
Erdoğan introduced two proposals partially to reverse the ban, both of which were successfully 
blocked by the secularist elite. Some scholars argue that the party dropped this issue without 
encouraging open debates aimed at reaching a societal consensus on the matter.
10 Likewise, the 
government’s proposal to increase religious vocational schools’ access to higher education was 
rejected by the president and then dropped instead of being amended and re-submitted. On both 
occasions the party had attempted to address issues of concern to its core constituency but had 
retreated when its proposals were resisted by the Kemalist elite – only to blame the failure on 
insufficient civil society activity to pressure traditional state institutions (despite the fact that the 
party allows very little civil society activity in its own policy-making).
11 In short, the AKP has 
not resolved the problematic relationship between Islam and Turkish secularism. 
In foreign policy, the AKP government has been willing to take risks and challenge Turkey’s 
traditional preference for preserving the status quo.
12 This characteristic has been seen in the 
government’s strong commitment to the EU despite the setbacks, but more importantly, in its 
new approach to the Cyprus conflict, wherein a “win-win approach” – in Mr Erdoğan’s words – 
was adopted in support of the Annan Plan. This change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy illustrates a 
‘civilianisation’ of Turkish foreign policy, to which the government contributed through reforms 
to strengthen civilian control over the military. Parliament’s decision not to allow US troops 
through Turkey during the Iraq war and the decision not to intervene militarily in northern Iraq 
were also signs of the shift in Turkish foreign policy from a Hobbesian realism to a slightly 
more Kantian approach that espouses diplomacy, negotiation and other civilian instruments such 
as economic and multilateral cooperation.
13 This new approach was also adopted towards the 
Arab world, with which relations have significantly improved under the AKP government. 
Relations with the West have been viewed as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, 
relations with the Islamic world. In the context of the ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ policy of 
the government, relations with both Greece and Syria have considerably improved.
14 Both 
Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Gül have highlighted on various occasions that 
Israel has the right to exist and that violence against it is unacceptable, and have conveyed this 
message to Hamas representative Khaled Mashal, whom they agreed to receive after the 
Palestinian elections. The Turkish government has also started to play a much more active role 
in the Organisation for Islamic Countries (OIC), as part of the importance it places on 
multilateral settings for foreign policy-making. In the OIC, it has conveyed the message of the 
need for democratisation in the Arab world, embodied in the Istanbul Declaration adopted at the 
OIC Summit in June 2004. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., see the discussion on pp. 123-32. 
10 Ibid., pp. 127-33. 
11 Ibid., p. 127. 
12 See Kemal Kirişçi, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times, EU-ISS Chaillot Paper No. 92, EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, September 2006, pp. 49-52. 
13 Ibid. 
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The AKP and the EU   
The EU’s Copenhagen political criteria mirrored the AKP’s own strategy of political survival 
through the attainment of a wider democratic sphere of activity within Turkey, and hence 
relations with the EU have become a central theme of the party’s agenda. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the perceptions of Europe held within the party, interviews with AKP 
members of parliament and party policy advisers were conducted in September 2006.
15 
All of the interviewees stated that they do not regard Turkey’s political reform process as 
sufficient or complete. Freedom of speech, civilian control over the military, the headscarf ban, 
more decentralisation and reinforcement of local governance, and the quality of democratic 
governance were the most commonly cited areas where further and far-reaching reform was 
deemed necessary. Again, while aspiring to a faster and more extensive process of reform in 
principle, the difficulty of attaining rapid reform in the Turkish context was often highlighted. 
The slow changes in mentality among the population and bureaucracy were considered a major 
reason behind the difficulties experienced especially with implementation. As articulated by one 
MP: 
We need further decentralisation and localisation in all areas except for foreign policy, 
defence and education; this is the ideal democratic model. …However, this is impossible for 
Turkey in the next five to ten years. The social, cultural and educational levels of the public 
are not ready to support such a model and the situation in Iraq is not making it any easier. 
So this is indeed the ideal among the party’s decision-makers, but there are restrictions that 
are keeping us back.…As for the reforms that we have already undertaken in the field of 
democracy and human rights, more could be done, especially regarding freedom of 
expression. Nevertheless, a mental transformation is needed especially among the judiciary 
and the police force for proper implementation. Whatever the law is, you can always find a 
judge to try Hrant Dink.
16 We can only overcome this through education. We need a new 
generation for the implementation and the sustainability of these reforms. 
A prominent policy adviser within the party also highlighted similar points, stating: 
The problem is with implementation. You cannot change an established way of thinking 
and behaving that has been entrenched for 40-50 years overnight.…There is also the 
problem that some aspects of the process are not shared fully by all the relevant actors. 
Think of our bill on public administration reform, which was a very necessary law to 
strengthen local governments and was vetoed by the President. We should be able to 
achieve decentralisation without threatening the unitary nature of the state; that should be 
possible. The Ottoman Empire could have kept a few more territories if it delegated more 
power to local administrations. The same goes for civilian–military relations. It has to be 
internalised by all the relevant parties for genuine change to take root, but that is going to 
take an awful lot of time. 
                                                 
15 The interviews were conducted solely for the purposes of this research project. A total number of 12 
persons were interviewed for this study. The interviews were conducted in a face-to-face format in 
Ankara and in Istanbul. All of the interviewees agreed to be quoted, subject to anonymity. 
16 A case was filed against a famous non-governmental organisation activist and journalist, Hrant Dink, 
on the basis of an article he wrote on the need for Armenians in Armenia and the diaspora to make peace 
with their identity by refusing to view the Turks as their eternal Others. The complaint was made by the 
Lawyers’ Association and was brought to court by a public prosecutor on the basis of Article 301. Dink 
was given a suspended six-month prison sentence in total disregard of the expert testimony that the article 
had been ‘misinterpreted’ and Dink appealed to the High Court. The head prosecutor of the High Court 
called for an annulment of the case on grounds of procedure and substance. Dink’s case was referred to 
the High Court and his sentence was eventually reiterated. POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY | 5 
The role of the EU is strongly acknowledged in the progress made in the areas of 
democratisation and human rights. The EU is not just seen as a political entity to be joined, but 
largely as a ‘democratic model’. This argument comes with qualifications, however. First, all of 
the party elites interviewed emphasised that democratisation was already among the primary 
aims of the party from the start of their political journey and that the EU has been more of an 
anchor in attaining further democracy in the country. As put by a party MP: 
We felt from the very beginning the desperate need for democratisation in the country and 
that was one of our main starting points. I view the EU as an anchor in that process…an 
anchor that can help all segments of Turkish society live in peace. There will not be any 
grounds for radicalisation, both ethnic and religious, with the EU anchor firmly in place. 
The EU project will also decrease the impact of politics on society by promoting good 
governance. The Turkish people will then expect policy-making from the politicians rather 
than daily demands that are the outcome of inefficient and corrupt governance. 
A party policy adviser expressed thoughts along the same line, stating: 
As a party, we wish to see a more democratic Turkey, but we have to face the fact that our 
internal dynamics are not sufficient enough to achieve this. The EU compensates for 
insufficient internal dynamism. …I am not saying that there are no problems with 
democracy in Europe. Look at how the French Armenians are exploiting French 
democracy, against the interests of France. But you cannot turn your back on it just because 
it has its problems. The democracy in Europe is still the best model today. 
Another MP provided further details as to how the EU’s process coincided with the agenda of 
the party: 
February 28 has shown us that there are some things that Turkey cannot achieve on her 
own. I am not talking about Turkey becoming a Shari’a state. What I am talking about is an 
environment where you can teach your child as much about religion as you want, where my 
wife can wear whatever she likes and where I will not be punished because of my religious 
beliefs. We realised that the prominence of individual rights within the EU can actually help 
us in decreasing the weight of the institutions in the Turkish political system and hence 
achieve the minimum in sustaining our lifestyles.  
Second, the EU is not viewed as possessing one single model of democracy that the country can 
take as a point of reference. Several different democratic practices on diverse issues are 
acknowledged to exist in Europe. As a policy adviser in the party held: 
There is not a single model of democracy in Europe. It is the fundamental principles that 
matter the most to us, and those are embodied in the Copenhagen political criteria and they 
are not exclusive to Europe, they are universal principles. There are vast differences 
between the way in which democracies are institutionalised and function in Europe. Just 
look at the way in which religion–state relations are regulated. On the one hand, you have a 
country like France, and on the other hand you have a country like Greece, which can be 
classified as an almost theocratic state. Turkey can benefit from different practices in 
different member states, depending on its own needs. 
Regarding the more specific democratic practices that Turkey can adopt from Europe, two 
issues are prioritised, namely minority rights and religious freedoms (more specifically, the 
public role of religion) – the two unresolved tensions of Turkish politics. In the case of minority 
rights, the French model is considered to be more suitable for Turkey, whereas in the field of 
religious freedoms, the UK model prevails. 
Third, while these perceptions are dominant among the majority of the party elite, this does not 
mean that problems with European democracies are overlooked. It should be noted that 
alternative yet minority discourses that do not hold Europe as a democratic model exist. As an 
MP who explicitly claims to be a Euro-sceptic argued: 6 | AYDIN &ÇAKIR  
Europe is not a democratic model for Turkey. Europe is the by-product of ruthless wars, the 
EU itself is a product of Europe’s ruthlessness. It has all been about how three big and three 
small member states control each other. I have in mind a democracy that is more replete 
with virtue and empathy. I find Europe to be too ‘worldly’.…It is true that reforms are 
easier to sell to the public when the EU is there, it triggers the learning process in society 
and the technical requirements that it introduces can improve living standards, but that is 
all. I don’t share the view that it is a community of consistent values. 
The same MP also expressed critical thoughts on the rights of Muslim minorities within Europe, 
“It is true that Muslims benefit from generous rights in most member states. However, these 
rights are not considered natural by birth, with their philosophical foundations. They give them 
rights because they have to and this is where the problem lies.” 
Another MP who had reservations about Europe as a normative reference for democratic 
aspirations also expressed his doubts regarding the state of Muslim minority rights in Europe: 
“Europe’s experience with minorities only goes back 50 years. It has very little experience on 
this issue. This is why Muslim minorities are experiencing serious problems in Europe. Europe 
does not know how to deal with people from different cultures, whereas we have a 1,000 year 
history of living in a multicultural environment.” 
It is not only the more Euro-sceptic elite who are critical of Muslim minority rights in Europe. 
Other more pro-European elites also perceive problems with the way in which Muslim 
minorities are treated in Europe. Still, they often distinguish between different country practices, 
viewing some models – the British, the Dutch and the Scandinavian – more favourably than 
they do others, such as that of the French. It is believed that in terms of the rights granted to 
Muslims, even the most restricted country, France, where there is no headscarf ban in 
universities, is a far more advanced case than Turkey. In the words of a political adviser: 
Countries have different practices in Muslim minority rights. On the one hand, you have the 
Dutch model, and on the other hand, you have the French model. They are all having 
problems, especially with racism and xenophobia, but overall, I don’t see a huge problem 
here. There are around 6,000 mosques in Germany, there is no headscarf ban anywhere in 
Europe and they can all practice their religion as they please. 
An MP voiced similar opinions, stating: 
Problems with Muslim minority rights exist in some, but not in all European countries. 
Look at Holland. There are 264 mosques that the Turks go to, there is no headscarf ban, and 
there are no problems with religious education. The Moroccans for example have their own 
separate mosques. However, you also have more problematic cases like France. Recently, 
some problems began to emerge in Germany since they want to restrict education in the 
mother tongue. So these problems don’t always have something to do with Islam, but they 
can also be about language. But I still don’t see a huge problem there. 
There were other party officials who sought to provide a more detailed account of the problems 
regarding Muslim minority rights in Europe, for example one who stated:  
I think the issue has a psychological, institutional and an economic dimension. At the 
psychological level, the prevailing notion of Euro-centrism and the feeling of uniqueness 
among some in Europe have prevented Europe from being a melting pot like the United 
States. At the institutional level, you need strong institutional mechanisms to integrate these 
people, to give them proper religious education to prevent radicalism, to teach them the 
language of the host country and to preserve the cultures of the minority groups. You 
cannot achieve these via things like language tests. At the economic level, you need to 
make sure that these people have a chance to move beyond their ghettos. That of course 
requires strong political commitment. Immigration policies also require close relations with 
the countries of origin. For example, our relations with Germany are in a much better state 
now than they used to be. POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY | 7 
The issue of Muslim minority rights in Europe is often related to the debate over the differences 
and similarities between the EU and US models of democracy. Such comparison is made in two 
related spheres. One concerns democratic practices within Europe and the US, whereas the 
second relates to the use of the notion of democracy in foreign policy, specifically in the 
southern neighbourhood. Regarding democratic practices within the two, despite acknowledging 
the prevailing notion of ‘security’ and the curbing of freedoms in the US in the post-11 
September period, the US model is still viewed more favourably in the context of minority 
rights, religious freedoms and the application of secularism in the country. As one party official 
argued: 
National identity is very strong in Europe, unlike in the US. Being German comes from 
birth; it is very difficult to acquire it later. If you do not speak good French, you cannot be a 
Frenchman. Britain has a rooted past based on traditions. It is easier to integrate in the US, 
to move up in the system. An immigrant can become a foreign minister in the US whereas 
this would be very difficult in the case of Europe. 
According to an MP: 
[O]n the issue of religion, the Anglo-Saxons have encountered Islam in more peaceful 
circumstances. So especially until 11 September, there has been less prejudice towards 
Islam in the US. Continental Europe in particular has fought Islam for centuries in its 
history and so their attitude towards Islam is more hostile than the Americans. Religion is a 
more distinguishing feature in Europe than it is in the US. 
Similarly, another MP expressed the following sentiments: 
It is true that the US experienced a serious turning point in its democracy after 11 
September. It has entered a phase of paranoia on security and terrorism. However, as for the 
upper limits of democracy, the margins always were and still are wider in the US than in 
Europe since the regime still has a lot of confidence in itself. The democratic system still 
works better in America. Just look at secularism and religious freedoms in the US and you 
will appreciate how wide the margins really are. 
These statements are also in line with the findings of other scholars who argue that AKP 
officials feel closer to the US model, which is referred to as a kind of “passive secularism”, 
wherein “the state is neutral towards various religions, but allows the public visibility of 
religion”, as opposed to practices in countries such as France, where “the state favours a secular 
worldview in the public sphere and aims to confine religion to the private sphere”, also referred 
to as “assertive secularism”.
17  
The instance in which American democracy is most criticised is the way in which US foreign 
policy practices are not challenged sufficiently in the domestic sphere. As a party official 
underlined: 
There are two sides to America. It is doing rather well on the inside, but its foreign policy 
practices make us question the democratic practice inside the country. In Europe, public 
opinion and civil society are able to constrain governments. Aznar lost the elections in 
Spain because of his stance on the war in Iraq. Blair has been put in a difficult position in 
the UK, but this does not go for the US. 
A related argument is put forward by another party MP, “One thing about US democracy is that 
brain-washing of the public is much easier there than it is in Europe. In that sense, I see a deeper 
understanding of democracy among the European publics.” 
                                                 
17 See Ahmet T. Kuru, “Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and 
Development Party”, in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK 
Parti, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006, p. 137.  8 | AYDIN &ÇAKIR  
Some party officials have been highly critical of the way in which the notion of democracy is 
upheld in both European and American foreign policies, while others have emphasised that they 
find Europe to be more genuine in its efforts to promote democracy in its neighbourhood. The 
remarks of a prominent foreign policy adviser are exemplary of those who criticise the notion of 
democracy in both European and American foreign policy approaches: 
One can argue that the EU is more principled and genuine than instrumental when it comes 
to democratisation in its candidate countries. However when it comes to other countries, 
Europe behaves very pragmatically. Look at the way in which they supported the military 
coup in Algeria for example, or look at their policies in the southern neighbourhood. The 
use of democracy in US foreign policy can also be considered fully instrumental, even more 
so than in Europe since you cannot be a candidate to join the US. For the US, democracy is 
an instrument that is disguised as a principle. You only need to look at the reactions of the 
US to the elections held in Iraq, Egypt and Palestine last year. Palestinian elections were the 
fairest; participation was very low in Iraq and there were population displacements; the 
opposition was not even given a chance in Egypt. Elections in Iraq were found much more 
successful and legitimate, the results in Egypt were considered legitimate, but the results of 
the Palestinian elections were not even considered legitimate. So the US only approaches 
democracy from the perspective of its own foreign policy interests and this goes pretty 
much for Europe as well. 
An MP making a similar argument stated, “I think both the EU and the US lack sincerity in their 
foreign policy approaches. For them it is all about how democracy can be instrumentalised for 
their own interest. They do not have any problems with authoritarianism in Jordan, Egypt or 
Saudi Arabia, but they are pushing for democracy in other countries.” 
Yet, this dual critique is not shared by all in the party. An equal number of interviewees 
consider EU foreign policy and its emphasis on democratisation as more sincere, although they 
question its effectiveness in practice. As one MP stated: 
EU foreign policy is much softer and relies more on diplomacy and gradual change. The US 
tries to bring democracy through force, not through dialogue and participation of all the 
parties concerned. The EU expects countries to reform themselves from within and lays 
down the rules for that. The US forces you to apply the rules that it has set. Until 2002, 
Turkey was completely under the orbit of the US and its democracy has not exactly 
benefited from it; in fact, just the opposite. 
Another party official expressed similar thoughts: 
I find EU foreign policy to be more genuine than that of the US. The problem with the EU 
is that there are many different member states with diverse interests preventing it from 
having a strong common foreign policy. There are those that are closer to the US and those 
that are at the other end of the spectrum. [sic] How can you expect them to formulate a 
coherent and effective foreign policy like that? 
A discussion about EU and US foreign policy approaches revealed that the party elite has a high 
level of awareness of EU policy in the Mediterranean, and although EU efforts in the region are 
viewed more favourably in comparison with those of the US they are still criticised. The 
criticism is mainly on the grounds that the EU’s primary concern is to secure its own interests in 
the region and that it does not allow for equal, sufficient and effective participation of the 
relevant parties in the southern neighbourhood. In the words of a party official: 
The ENP is in principle a good policy. Now that the Union has new members, the relations 
between its members in the periphery and the new neighbours have become more important 
than ever. You need to establish stronger and institutionalised cooperation mechanisms in 
the neighbourhood. The EU cannot pull its weight in the Mediterranean since it cannot 
escape from its pragmatic outlook on the region. It only cares about Tunisia and Morocco 
so that further instability does not lead to mass immigration into Europe. So I believe that POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY | 9 
keeping the region under a certain degree of control is more important for the Union than 
actually democratising it. This makes it very difficult for long-term principles to take root. 
This is not very different from what the EU is doing in the eastern neighbourhood. For 
example, it does not question what is happening between Armenia and Azerbaijan. You see 
an important amount of selectivity there. 
Another party official criticised the policy on the basis that the relationship between the EU and 
the neighbourhood countries is not one of equal partners: “I think the EU policy in the 
Mediterranean has the potential to be successful, but the EU has to stop viewing its 
Mediterranean policy as a one-sided favour rather than a constructive dialogue. The policy 
needs to reach a position where the two parties stand on equal grounds. I do not think that it has 
come to that stage yet.” 
Cooperation and conflict 
There are four main areas that AKP party officials hold to be the main spheres of cooperation 
with the EU, namely the strengthening of democracy and human rights (some explicitly mention 
the further civilianisation of Turkish politics), economic relations, good governance through the 
adoption of the EU acquis, and foreign and security policy (including energy issues). 
It is believed that “not only can the EU help Turkey in further democratisation but Turkey can 
also help the EU in spreading democracy in its neighbourhood”, as one official put it. In terms 
of economic relations, the levels of trade and investments between the EU and Turkey are often 
cited as the primary indicators of how the two economies are intertwined and how further 
investment in particular would be beneficial for the Turkish economy. Regarding foreign and 
security policy, the ‘interdependence’ of the two sides is a recurrent theme, although the EU is 
often found to be ‘underutilising’ the potential for collaboration with Turkey in this area. 
According to a party official: 
Foreign policy issues that are not primary to Europe are of crucial importance to us, like 
Northern Iraq and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish foreign policy agenda coincides with 
the UN’s agenda. Turkey has more foreign policy responsibilities and concerns than the 
EU. As long as the EU does not feel the same degree of importance in the same areas, 
effective harmonisation and cooperation will be difficult to achieve. There is a significant 
degree of cooperation and consultation mechanisms…when it comes to domestic policy. 
We need equally strong consultation and cooperation mechanisms in foreign policy matters. 
The EU has turned to Turkey on problems with Iran; Turkey’s policy in the Iraq war and in 
Lebanon was in line with the EU; consultations were made on Palestine; but these need to 
be strengthened and better institutionalised. 
Conflictual areas can be classified under two main headings. One concerns the headscarf ban, 
which is viewed by an overwhelming majority of party officials as a human rights problem that 
is overlooked by the EU. The other conflictual area relates to the perception that the EU is 
applying a policy of double standards to Turkey.  
Concerning the headscarf ban, on 29 June 2004, in the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, the 
European Court of Human Rights decided that the Turkish state had not violated the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms by expelling Leyla Şahin from university 
because of her headscarf. The interviews conducted for this paper confirm that this decision has 
led to a significant degree of disappointment with Europe within the AKP, although it would be 
wrong to state that it has substantially reversed the party’s overall pro-EU orientation. It can be 
argued that the case led to a reassessment among certain segments of the party as to how far 
Europe could contribute to changes in Turkish secularism. The fact that EU reports only focus 
on the rights of Alevis and the non-Muslim minorities while keeping silent about the situation of 
the Sunni majority is also a factor that has helped strengthen this opinion. As a parliamentarian 
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I am very sensitive on the headscarf issue. Europe is liberal about the rights of everyone, 
but very cruel when it comes to one of the most important issues. They do not see this as a 
human rights issue. This has created a serious break of morale for us and led to 
disappointment with the EU. We feel really alone in an essential area of cooperation. Some 
in Europe understand, some do not. I do not know how we can ever put the message across. 
Another MP expressed similar sentiments: 
What really bothers me about the silence of the EU on the headscarf ban is the fact that 
nowhere in Europe is there a stricter ban than the one in Turkey, not even in France. For a 
pious woman, the headscarf is not the symbol of oppression but of liberation; this is what 
they do not understand. …What is even worse is the fact that when the issue is the 
headscarf or the religious freedoms of the Sunni majority, the EU sides with the Turkish 
military. The Turkish military then cleans its hands of the issue and leaves it to the EU, 
knowing that they can be just as strict. 
Although these criticisms seem to reflect the stance of the majority in the party, there are also 
the voices of others in the margin who do not see this as a conflictual issue in relations with the 
EU. As one parliamentarian argued: 
I do not think that the headscarf issue in Turkey has anything to do with the EU. True, 
Europe has its own issues with the headscarf, but I do not think that the EU should interfere 
in how Turkey deals with this issue. This is something that we ourselves have to resolve, 
through societal consensus; the EU does not have enough knowledge or experience of 
Turkish customs, traditions or religion to intervene in this matter.  
In the second area of conflict, namely the perception of EU double standards and discrimination, 
concerns seem to be even more profound and unanimously shared. It also needs to be noted that 
these concerns overlap almost entirely with those of the secularist establishment about the EU. 
Such perceptions of double standards are invoked in relation to various issues. EU policy in 
Cyprus is chief among them. All of our interviewees berated EU policy in Cyprus as a blatant 
act of discrimination against Turkey. As one policy adviser argued, “the constant rewarding of 
Greek Cypriots after the referendum has led to cleavages within the party”. Another issue in 
which discrimination is inferred relates to minority rights, particularly regarding the rights of the 
Kurdish minority. The example of the French model often arises as the most suitable for Turkey 
in this respect. It is also very commonly held that the EU overlooks its own minority problems 
such as the situation of the Turkish/Muslim minority in Greece while it is applying pressure on 
Turkey. The issue of minority rights is often brought up together with the Armenian genocide 
debate. This issue is influenced by the fact that the European Parliament’s Eurlings report in its 
draft format asked for recognition of the Armenian genocide as an official criterion for Turkey’s 
accession. In the words of one MP, “You cannot possibly force this population to endorse a 
crime that it has not committed. This is a problem with the EU’s own collective sub-conscious, 
trying to spread its own guilty conscious onto others.” 
Another issue that elicits the discrimination argument involves the clause that allows permanent 
derogations in the EU’s negotiating framework with Turkey. As one party official underlined:  
The EU is saying that they need to allow for permanent derogations to ease the concerns of 
their public. They are also saying that it is our duty to win the hearts and minds of European 
citizens. Why was this argument never made for any other candidate country? I really 
believe that the EU is not being fair to Turkey. 
Such double standards are very often held to be the symptomatic surface of the EU’s 
unwillingness to have a Muslim country ‘in the club’. As the same party official remarks, “The 
main perception in the party is one of being discriminated against by the EU because we come 
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instead they are trying to make us give up on the way by asking for requirements not asked from 
other candidates.” 
Islamists outside the AKP 
The AKP is not the only party in the Turkish political landscape that has a pro-Islamic 
orientation. The party that it split from – now functioning under the name of the Saadet 
[Felicity] Party (SP) – tries to appeal to a core Islamist constituency from further to the right of 
the political spectrum and a more explicitly Islamic outlook. The SP only managed to win 2.5% 
of the votes in the 2002 elections and hence it is not represented in parliament.
18 Nevertheless, it 
can still be considered a challenger to the AKP’s core constituency who may be alienated from 
the party because of its reluctance to act on issues regarding the public role of Islam. In this 
respect, the party programme states, “The artificial impediments in education that are against 
human rights and the principles of belief will be abolished, the practices that prevent the 
graduates of religious schools to enter the faculty of their choice will be lifted. Human rights 
and democracy courses and courses on religion and ethics will be compulsory in schools.” 
The party has also returned to its 1970s slogan of ‘ethics and morality first’, which was not 
present in the discourse of its predecessor party in the 1980s and 1990s: 
Ethics and morality are our flags. History has witnessed that nations who stick to their 
moral and ethical values have established big civilisations whereas those that deviated from 
them have lost their power.…For that reason, we believe that the strengthening of our 
ethics is compulsory for a healthy community. 
The SP also adopts an anti-Western outlook with a discourse that is once again reminiscent of 
the 1970s National Salvation Party. It is explicitly against the US and is strongly opposed to 
accession to the EU. Europe is viewed as a ‘Christian club’ that a country of Muslim people 
should not seek to join. As the head of the party, Recai Kutan, has recently stated: 
Is there any other party in Anatolia that supports opposition to the US other than us? No. 
There is only the Felicity Party that represents the National Outlook. The obsession with 
the European Union has destroyed them [the AKP]. They keep on saying ‘we will never 
let Turkey join, not in a thousand years’. When will Turkey join the EU then? Only when 
religious people die and those young generations [of Turks] who are able to convert are 
fully grown up. Only then Turkey will be accepted in the European Union, which is a 
Christian club.
19  
The incompatibility of Western values with Islam is also often invoked together with claims that 
instead of pressing for EU membership, Turkey should look more towards the East. According 
to Mr Kutan, “full membership of the EU means compromising independence and surrendering 
to Western culture and civilisation”, whereas Turkey should be “leading the Islamic world to 
create a more just world order”.
20 Europe and Islam are often placed in binary opposition to 
each other where Islam is looked upon as the biggest enemy of Europe today. It is observed that 
such SP discourse usually intensifies in the immediate aftermath of key events such as the visit 
by Pope Benedict XVI to Turkey and the Danish cartoons crisis. Immediately following the 
latter episode, the party’s Vice President, Lütfü Esengün, argued that “this event has revealed 
once again Europe’s true face as an enemy of the East and Islam with its media, governments, 
courts and civil society institutions…this comes from history. Animosity towards Islam is in the 
                                                 
18 There is a 10% electoral threshold for representation in the Turkish parliament. 
19 See the Milli Gazete, 12 June 2005. 
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genes of the West…Europe displays its hatred and vengeance…at every available 
opportunity.”
21 
It is very often claimed that Western civilisation, of which Europe is held to be an essential 
component, is unjust and consists of double standards. In the words of the party’s vice 
chairman, “The main source of the problems that we are suffering today lies in modern Western 
values. In this sense we are facing a civilisational crisis.…The values of the Western world can 
no longer sustain this world.”
22 
The SP is not only opposed to closer relations with Europe solely on cultural and civilisational 
grounds, but also on the basis of the extreme nationalist stance that Europe’s ultimate aim is to 
divide and partition the country. The two arguments are often combined in expressing 
oppositional views to Europe: “The concessions given to Europe threaten the country’s unity, 
enslave the Turkish economy and corrupt our moral values”
23 and “Europe’s aim is to have a 
disintegrating and Christianised Turkey”.
24  
The ‘hostile’ Europe that the SP discourse constructs is not a model of democracy and human 
rights, but one of a ruthless entity that turns a blind eye to developments in the southern 
neighbourhood: 
Those Europeans who teach us human rights lessons are themselves human rights violators. 
Hundreds of thousands of people are being slaughtered only because of their beliefs in Iraq, 
Palestine and Lebanon. This is the Western conception of human rights; their civilisation 
upholds blood, tears and sheer force…the AKP is talking of attaining EU standards. Europe 
is not a civilisation; who are you taking as a model?
25  
Turkey’s Hizbollah party is a marginal force; based in south-east Turkey, it is a militant Islamist 
Sunni group unrelated to the Lebanon-based Shi’ite Hizbollah, with a history of violent struggle 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Turkish Hizbollah is not a strong political force; 
rather it has managed to survive by virtue of its social roots. It is the part of the Islamist 
spectrum most clearly at odds with the EU. Indeed, the main preoccupation of the Turkish 
Hizbollah is now related to European countries’ clampdown on (what are deemed to be) terrorist 
groups, rather than its opposition to the Turkish state. Hizbollah claims that it has renounced 
violence, but serious doubts remain over the compatibility of its ideology with the democratic 
values pursued by the government in cooperation with the EU. There is no strong evidence to 
suggest that the ultimate goal of jihad has been dropped from the Hizbollah agenda. Although a 
marginal force, Hizbollah still competes with Kurdish nationalism for the allegiances of people 
in the south-east, presenting a potential threat of further instability in a region that already 
requires far-reaching reforms on the road to EU accession.  
                                                 
21 See the article “İslam düşmanlığı batının genlerine işlemiştir” on the SP website, 8 February 2006 
(retrieved from http://www.sp.org.tr/haber.asp?list=6&haber=918). 
22 See the speech of SP Vice President Numan Kurtuluş, delivered at the Confederation of Civil Servants’ 
Union (Memur-Sen), published on the SP website 24 November 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.sp.org.tr/haber.asp?list=2&haber=1208). 
23 See the speech of SP Vice President Temel Karamollaoğlu, delivered at the Party Press Conference at 
the SP Headquarters, published on the SP website 10 November 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.sp.org.tr/haber.asp?list=2&haber=1175). 
24 See the speech of the President of Anatolian Youth Association İlyas Tongus, delivered at the Regional 
Education Seminar of the Anatolian Youth Association, published on the SP website 12 December 2006 
(retrieved from http://www.sp.org.tr/haber.asp?list=1&haber=1233).  
25 See the speech of İlyas Tongus, delivered at the Anatolian Youth Association, Karaman Branch, 
published on the SP website 17 October 2006 (retrieved from http://www.sp.org.tr/haber.asp?list=2 
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Conclusions 
An overwhelming majority of AKP members view the EU as the primary anchor of Turkish 
democracy and modernisation, despite the perceived limitations of cooperation on issues 
relating to the reform of Turkish secularism. Yet growing mistrust towards the EU as a result of 
inferred discrimination and double-standard practices by the EU has a serious potential to 
reverse these perceptions within the party. This concern also links to arguments over the 
emergence of a Turkish model for other Muslim countries. Turkey is indeed a case in which an 
Islamic legacy has not prevented democratic reform and it is being watched closely by some of 
the political movements in the Arab world, thanks also to Turkey’s improving relations with its 
southern neighbours. Nevertheless, the EU accession process, which has played a crucial role in 
triggering change, remains uncertain and Turkey still has not come to terms with issues arising 
from the politics of Islamic identity that lie at the heart of the debates over Islam and 
democracy. On top of this, the Turkish experience with secularism, however problematic, has 
also played a unique and powerful role in shaping the opinions of Islamists in the country, 
making it very difficult to emulate Turkey’s reform process elsewhere in the Muslim world. 
Hence, rather than being a “model”, one can at best see Turkey as “an example from which 
lessons can be drawn”,
26 hoping that it will, in the meantime, stay on course for full 
democratisation and EU accession.  
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